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RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE TO TRUGREEN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents provide only the following limited response to certain 
mischaracterizations of the record contained in TruGreen's statement of facts: 
1. The certified questions were not predicated on any finding of liability by 
the District Court on TruGreen's breach of contract or tortious interference claims. To 
the contrary, the issue of liability has not been decided, as the District Court explained in 
noting the causation and damages deficiencies in TruGreen's remaining claims: 
TruGreen has failed to provide the court with evidence that would raise a 
reasonable inference supporting causation and damages. TruGreen has 
failed to provide any admissible evidence that shows a causal connection 
between TruGreen's alleged damages and the alleged wrongful conduct of 
the Defendants. 
R.286 at 8 (emphasis added).1 
2. While TruGreen argues that all of its sales training, marketing and financial 
information, and business practices are confidential, TruGreen's Brief at 7, the District 
Court made no determination whether any such information is confidential. R.253, 286. 
Moreover, there was no evidence that the former TruGreen employees took or used any 
allegedly confidential information. R.184 at xi-xii. 
3. Contrary to TruGreen's assertion, before hiring Mantz or the other former 
TruGreen employees, Mower Brothers did not have knowledge of the terms of these 
employees' agreements with TruGreen. R.201 at xxvii-xxx. There also is no evidence 
1
 TruGreen stated in its initial brief that it was "faced with the practicality of 
arguing the merits of restitution on relatively few written findings of liability (especially 
with the [sic] respect to Respondents' tortious conduct)." TruGreen's Brief at 6. 
Contrary to TruGreen's assertion, there were no written findings of liability. 
1 
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that Mower Brothers pursued Mantz or other TruGreen employees with the intent to 
acquire and exploit TruGreen's marketing and training expertise or to cripple TruGreen's 
business. No evidence of any wrongful purpose or wrongful means was presented. 
R. 184 at 12-13; 206 at 33-36. Mower Brothers hired the former TruGreen employees to 
fill its available positions and not to harm or damage TruGreen. R.184 at Exh. 2, Tf 35. 
4. TruGreen mischaracterizes its applicable employment agreements as 
"liquidated damages covenants" that "operate as a contractual measure of restitution." 
TruGreen's Brief at 44-45. The clause relied on by TruGreen instead merely provides: 
In the event of a breach or threatened breach by me of any provision of this 
Agreement, the damages which TruGreen might suffer would be difficult or 
impossible to measure and, therefore, TruGreen shall be entitled to an 
injunction restraining me from 1) using or disclosing TruGreen's customer 
list(s) and/or Confidential Business information, and 2) diverting or 
soliciting any customer or customers of TruGreen in violation of the 
Agreement. Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting TruGreen 
from pursuing any other remedies available to it for such breach or 
threatened breach including, but not limited to, the recovery of damages 
from me in an amount equal to the revenues gained by or from the breach. 
R.180 at Att. # 1, Exh. 9 ^ 6 (Mantz's 4/19/93 agreement); R.188 at Att. # 1, Exh. 2 U 6 
(Stephenson's 1/2/03 agreement); R.188 at Att. # 2, Exh. 2 ^ 6 (LeBlanc's 2/4/02 
agreement) (emphasis added). 
This clause is not in any employment agreement that is binding on any remaining 
defendant. Instead, it is found only in the employment agreements of Mantz, Stephenson, 
and LeBlanc, cited above, which were superseded by subsequent TruGreen employment 
agreements that lack this language. R.253 at 32-33. 
SLC 140835 
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5. The District Court dismissed TruGreen's claim for punitive damages, 
holding that TruGreen was not entitled to punitive damages as a matter of law: 
TruGreen has failed to demonstrate additional aggravating circumstances, 
and the facts of this case are not so unusual or outrageous as to justify 
punitive damages. Consequently, the court eliminates punitive damages as 
a form of potential recovery for TruGreen. 
R.253 at 43-44. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE REMEDY FOR BREACH OF AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IS 
THE EMPLOYER'S ACTUAL LOST PROFITS RESULTING FROM THE 
BREACH. 
A. Utah Law Disallows Contractual Remedies Founded in Restitution or 
Unjust Enrichment 
The Court should reject TruGreen's new theory that "restitution" is a contractual 
remedy entitling it to respondents' revenues or profits, founded on what TruGreen 
describes as a purported "sea [of] change in the contract theory of damages." See 
TruGreen's Brief at 40. This Court—along with courts in most jurisdictions—has not 
subscribed to such a proposition. Rather, as TruGreen admits, it is hornbook law that 
"contract damages are generally compensatory and not restitutionary." Id. 
Indeed, this Court has already held that contractual remedies must center on the 
nonbreaching party's expectation interest, which does not give rise to restitution. See 
Respondents' Opening Brief, Point 1(A) (citing Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, 
Inc., 2004 UT 70, f 39, 98 P.3d 15, and other Utah authority). This Court recognizes that 
contract law "avoid[s] putting the plaintiff in a better position than he would have 
occupied but for the breach," Ford, 2004 UT 70 at \ 37, and also avoids punishing the 
3 
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breaching party, see Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 
1238 (Utah 1994). It is also well settled by this Court that "unjust enrichment" or 
"restitution" are equitable remedies, unavailable when there is a written contract. See 
Respondents' Opening Brief, Point 1(B) (citing American Towers Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v. 
CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192-93 (Utah 1996), Mann v. American W. Life 
Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978), and other Utah authorities). 
Resorting instead to other jurisdictions, TruGreen ignores these prior decisions 
altogether, which answer TruGreen's rhetorical question of "Why then is the 
disgorgement remedy not seen more often in contract law?" TruGreen's Brief at 41. 
Under controlling Utah law, the first certified question regarding contractual remedies 
should be answered in respondents' favor. 
B, Courts in Most Other Jurisdictions Recognize That Restitution is Not a 
Contractual Remedy for Breach of Employment Covenants, 
Even if it were necessary to look beyond Utah's borders—but it is unnecessary—a 
supermajority of cases from jurisdictions across the country, both old and new, confirm 
that restitution is unavailable for breach of a restrictive covenant in an employment 
agreement. See Respondents' Opening Brief, Point 1(C) (citing authorities from 
throughout United States recognizing lost profits alone as employer's remedy for breach 
of restrictive covenants in employment agreements). The two cases cited by TruGreen 
applying only Minnesota law do not overcome the overwhelming authority from other 
jurisdictions that should lead the Court to resolve the first certified question by holding 
that restitution is not a remedy in Utah for breach of contractual employment covenants. 
4 
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1. The Cherne Case from Minnesota Recognized Restitution as a 
Remedy for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, a Claim TruGreen 
Has Not Pled Here. 
TruGreen's reliance on Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc., 278 
N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979) (cited in TruGreen's Brief at 42), is misplaced. In Cherne, 
where the employer prevailed against former employees for breach of a non-compete 
agreement and for misappropriation of trade secrets, the court awarded damages equal to 
10% of the former employees' profits. Id. at 95. However, the court failed to specify 
whether the award was based on breach of contract or trade secrets misappropriation. Id. 
This distinction is important here because TruGreen never asserted a claim for 
misappropriation of trade secrets. R.l 15 (TruGreen's Amended Complaint). 
The Cherne court recognized that the employee's gain may be recovered as 
damages for trade secrets misappropriation, id. at 94 (citing Dobbs, Remedies § 10.5, at 
693), which is the law in Utah, but also ratified the traditional rule that contract damages 
are measured by the nonbreaching party's loss of expected benefits under the contract, id. 
at 94 (citing Dobbs, Remedies § 12.1). Based on Cherne s failure to explain whether its 
damages award was for breach of contract or trade secrets misappropriation, and 
Pursuant to section 13-24-4 of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, damages can 
include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused 
by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. See also 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 396 ("[A]fter the termination of the agency, the 
agent. . . has a duty to account for profits made by the sale or use of trade secrets."). 
However, TruGreen has not asserted a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets. 
SLC 140835 
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TruGreen's failure to plead a trade secrets claim, Cherne should not impact the resolution 
of the first certified question in respondents' favor. 
2. Storage Technology, Applying Minnesota Law, was a Tortious 
Interference Case, and thus is Inapposite to the Breach of Contract 
Issue Before the Court. 
There is no merit to TruGreen's contention that Storage Technology Corp. v. 
Cisco Systems, Inc., 395 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2005), stands for the proposition that "courts 
in some jurisdictions recognize restitution as an appropriate remedy for breaches of non-
competition and non-disclosure covenants." TruGreen's Brief at 42. Storage Technology 
was a tortious interference case and not a breach of contract case. The employer in 
Storage Technology asserted only Minnesota state law tort claims against its competitor 
for inducing employees to breach non-compete agreements and a duty of loyalty to their 
former employer. See Storage Technology., 395 F.3d at 922 (identifying employer's 
claim as "interference with contractual relations, inducing breach of contract, conversion, 
and breach of fiduciary duties"). The court also stated in dicta that the "remedy for 
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is also restitutionary" in Minnesota. Id, at 925 
(citation omitted). However, TruGreen has not asserted a breach of duty claim, R.l 15 
3
 The Cherne court also stated that it previously had found that "the violator of a 
covenant not to compete may be required to account for his profits, and such illegal 
profits may properly measure the damages." Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 94-95 (citing 
Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 297 N.W. 178, 182 (Minn. 1941), but also citing National 
School Studios, Inc. v. Superior School Photo Service, Inc., 242 P.2d 756 (Wash. 1952), 
which awarded no damages because plaintiff had failed to prove lost profits). The court 
in Peterson did not provide any analysis or case authority regarding the proper measure 
of damages for breach of a non-compete agreement, but merely held that evidence of the 
defendant's revenue and profit supported the finding that plaintiffs damages were at least 
$500. 
SLC 140835 
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(TruGreen's Amended Complaint), so Storage Technology's dicta about such a claim is 
inapplicable here. 
C. A Defendant's Gains Can Only Serve as a Proxy for Plaintiffs Lost 
Profits When Those Gains Are Derived from the Plaintiffs Actual 
Customers. 
While a defendant's gains usually are irrelevant to assessing a plaintiffs losses 
occasioned by breach of a restrictive covenant, in some cases courts have held that a 
defendant's profits may "be considered, in evidence, if shown to correspond, in whole or 
in part, with the loss of plaintiff." Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). 
TruGreen's own cases confirm the rule that a defendant's gains can only be used to 
determine a plaintiffs loss to the extent such gains come from the plaintiffs former or 
prospective customers, and that the court does not look at the defendant's gains from all 
sources.4 Because a defendant's gains from sales to individuals who were never 
plaintiffs customers does not serve as a proxy for plaintiffs losses caused by defendant's 
breach in this case, a court should not consider such gains. 
4
 See Respondents' Opening Brief at 20-22 nn.9-10 (citing multiple authorities); see also 
North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Or. 1976) ("From the record it 
appears that [a former employee], in breach of the contract with plaintiff, made sales to 
plaintiffs former customers which would otherwise have been made by plaintiff and that 
plaintiff thereby suffered a loss of profits. We agree with the trial court that [a former 
employee's new employer's] profits from such sales are a reasonable basis for estimating 
plaintiffs damages."); Merager v. Turnbull, 99 P.2d 434, 439 (Wash. 1949) (noting first 
that measure of damages for breach of non-compete agreement is "not the profits which a 
defendant realized in violation of an agreement" but considering defendants' gains 
because "the gains of [defendant] coincide with the loss sustained by the [plaintiff] 
during the period [defendants] breached the restrictive covenant"). 
7 
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Yet, TruGreen has not shown that any of the employee defendants had profits— 
much less profits derived from the employees' former customers at TruGreen. R.286 at 8 
(June 8, 2006 Order) ("In fact, TruGreen has failed to produce any evidence of what 
damage to TruGreen is attributable to any of the Defendants"); see also R.240 at 99 
(expert Derk G. Rasmussen opining, after comparing TruGreen and Mower Brothers' 
customer lists, that there has been no customer crossover due to alleged actions of 
respondents). Instead, TruGreen has sought to recover all of Mower Brothers' gross 
revenues. R.178 at iv. 
Not only does this improper damages theory based on Mower Brothers' revenues 
or profits fail to correspond to any actual loss of TruGreen, as the District Court held, 
R.286 at 8, but it also does not apply where TruGreen's contract claims are against its 
former employees, and not against Mower Brothers. Evidence of Mower Brothers' 
revenue or profit from sales to former customers—if TruGreen had such evidence, which 
it does not have, R.240 at 99—could not be considered as a proxy for TruGreen's lost 
profits allegedly caused by each former employee. Indeed, even under the clause 
specified by TruGreen, see Response to SOF \ 4, above, only evidence of each 
employee's gains could properly be considered as a proxy for TruGreen's lost profits 
caused by that employee's breaches—evidence that TruGreen also lacks. TruGreen has 
no evidence that any employee brought to Mower Brothers any customer he contacted 
while at TruGreen. R.233 at 23. As a result, TruGreen's analysis should be rejected. 
SLC 140835 
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D, The Remaining Employment Agreements Before the Court Do Not 
Provide the Remedy TruGreen Proposes, 
TruGreen argues that there is a "liquidated damages" provision in certain 
employment agreements at issue that provides, contractually, the remedy of restitution. 
This argument should be rejected on several grounds. 
1. The Provision in Question is Found Only in Agreements That Have 
Been Superseded and No Longer are Binding on Any Employee 
Defendant. 
The provision relied on by TruGreen to support its "liquidated damages" argument 
is not found in any agreements still in force. The complete language provides: 
In the event of a breach or threatened breach by me of any provision of this 
Agreement, the damages which TruGreen might suffer would be difficult or 
impossible to measure and, therefore, TruGreen shall be entitled to an 
injunction restraining me from 1) using or disclosing TruGreen's customer 
list(s) and/or Confidential Business information, and 2) diverting or 
soliciting any customer or customers of TruGreen in violation of the 
Agreement. Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting TruGreen 
from pursuing any other remedies available to it for such breach or 
threatened breach including, but not limited to, the recovery of damages 
from me in an amount equal to the revenues gained by or from the breach. 
See Respondents' Response to TruGreen's Statement of Facts at f^ 4, above. This 
language is only found in three employees5 agreements, which have been superseded by 
later agreements not containing such language. See id. Thus, TruGreen's argument is 
moot and should be rejected. 
2. The Interpretation of the So-Called "Liquidated Damages 
Covenants" Has Not Been Certified and Should Not Be Considered. 
The Court should not consider TruGreen's "liquidated damages" argument 
anyway because it is not properly before the Court. The first certified question does not 
9 
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relate to the interpretation of any contractual liquidated damages provision, but simply 
three other contractual covenants. See Order of Acceptance. TruGreen urges the Court 
to go beyond the certified question by raising a collateral issue of contract interpretation 
that the District Court did not certify and this Court did not accept. 
3. The Language of the Provision in Question Does Not Permit a 
Remedy That Is Otherwise Unavailable Under Utah Law. 
If the Court were to consider TruGreen's "liquidated damages" argument (and 
even if the language in question were contained in a binding agreement, which is not the 
case), the provision still fails to support the view that restitution is available for breach of 
the three restrictive covenants before the Court. First, the provision is not a liquidated 
damages clause. It does not create any new breach-of-contract remedy, but instead only 
allows TruGreen to pursue remedies "available to it for such a breach," and lost profits is 
the sole remedy available at law for breach of a restrictive employment covenant. See 
Point 1(A), (B), (C), above. 
Second, if this provision provided a new contractual remedy, which it does not do, 
the requirement of causation is still embedded in the provision, which requires that the 
profits be "gained by or from the breach," and the District Court has already determined 
as a matter of law that "TruGreen has failed to provide the court with evidence that would 
raise a reasonable inference supporting causation and damages." R.286 at 8. 
Third, evidence of a defendant's profit may be considered only "if shown to 
correspond, in whole or in part, with the loss of plaintiff," Dunn, 670 P.2d at 61, which 
TruGreen has not shown. See Point 1(C), above. 
10 
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Last, in a case like this where the harm to TruGreen, if any, is readily 
ascertainable, construing this language as a liquidated damages clause still would not, 
under Utah law, provide to TruGreen anything more than its actual damages caused by 
the alleged breach. See Robbins v. Findlay, 645 P.2d 623, 635-36 (Utah 1982) (noting 
that to be enforceable, a liquidated damages provision must be "based on a reasonable 
relation to actual damages" and damages must be very difficult of estimation). 
Ultimately, TruGreen failed in its burden to show the District Court some proof of 
causation and actual damages from alleged contract breaches, and has failed to show any 
reason for the Court to create a new remedy that neither exists in Utah nor in the vast 
majority of other jurisdictions. The Court should resolve the first certified question by 
relying on its prior decisions and ruling in Respondents' favor. 
II. THE REMEDY FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
CONTRACTUAL OR ECONOMIC RELATIONS IS LOST PROFITS. 
Utah law allows only lost profit damages for tortious interference, and other 
jurisdictions addressing the issue overwhelmingly agree. See Respondents' Opening 
Brief at Point II. Ignoring precedent from Utah and other persuasive authority, TruGreen 
resorts to a number of cases from other jurisdictions containing significantly different 
facts, which are not persuasive and are otherwise insufficient to overcome the weight of 
Utah authority establishing that lost profits damages are the appropriate remedy for 
tortious interference. 
SLC 140835 
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A. TruGreen's Own Authorities Do Not Recognize Restitution as an 
Appropriate Remedy for Tortious Interference, 
The tortious interference cases cited in TruGreen's brief are distinguishable and 
should not preclude the Court from recognizing well-settled Utah law that the remedy for 
tortious interference is lost profits—and not restitution. TruGreen's authorities are 
distinguished in detail below. 
1. TruGreen's Ohio Authority Recognizes That a Plaintiff Explicitly 
Seeking Only Restitution Should Be Denied Such Relief. 
Where a plaintiff fails to prove its own lost profits due to alleged tortious 
interference (seeking instead only unjust enrichment), TruGreen's own authority 
recognizes that no recovery can be awarded. TruGreen attempts to distinguish the case of 
Developers Three v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990), 
cited by respondents, but ignores language in the later Ohio case on which TruGreen 
relies, Try Hours, Inc. v. Swartz, 2007 Ohio 1328 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (cited in 
TruGreen's Brief at 32), where the same Ohio court squarely confirmed the applicability 
of the Developers Three rule to facts analogous to those present here: 
[T]he holding in Developers Three is clearly limited to situations wherein 
the plaintiff seeks recovery on the basis of unjust enrichment. [In] 
Developers Three, the plaintiff explicitly was not seeking a recovery on the 
basis of lost profits. Hence, the Tenth District was charged with 
determining whether the plaintiff could disgorge defendant of its profits 
pursuant to a theory of unjust enrichment, rather than upon a "lost profits" 
basis. Ultimately, the court rejected the plaintiffs theory of recovery on 
the basis of unjust enrichment, "plaintiffs correct measure of damages in 
this tortious interference action is the plaintiffs loss (including lost profits) 
that arises out of the tortious interference, not the defendant's gain," and 
affirmed a compensatory damages method of recovery. 
SLC 140835 
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Id. at \ 27 (citing Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1136) (emphasis added). 
The instant case is similar. TruGreen freely admits on its third attempt to state 
damages that it sought to recover all of Mower Brothers' gains, without attempting to 
prove its lost profits. See TruGreen's Brief at 4 (acknowledging that its theory was not 
"sort of a lost profit damage calculation" but rather a theory of restitution). The District 
Court properly held "that TruGreen has failed to provide the court with evidence that 
would raise a reasonable inference supporting causation and damages." R.286 at 8 (June 
8, 2006 Order). Thus, as in Developers Three, and as confirmed by Try Hours, 
TruGreen's "unjust enrichment" theory should be rejected, and the second certified 
question should be answered in respondents' favor. 
2. TruGreen's Leading Cases Allowing Restitution Involve Other 
Claims in Addition to Tortious Interference. 
The cases primarily relied on by TruGreen permit an award of restitution for 
claims that are not at issue in this case, and thus do not support TruGreen's position that 
this Court should authorize such a remedy in Utah for tortious interference. 
National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976), was not 
limited to tortious interference claims. Instead, restitution was granted as a civil 
contempt sanction against the defendants for failing to obey a consent decree and for 
inducing another to disobey the consent decree. The court specifically noted that the 
defendants "knowingly abetted the violation of a decree and could very likely have been 
charged themselves with civil contempt which can readily entail a disgorging of profits 
by the contemnor." Id. at 432. Other courts, including those in Massachusetts, have 
13 
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noted the limited reach of National Merchandising. See, e.g., Buster v. George W. 
Moore, Inc., 1997 Mass. App. LEXIS 1195 (refusing to consider National Merchandising 
in tortious interference action because damages in National Merchandising "flowed from 
the violations of the consent decree"); Commonwealth v. Charlett, 481 Pa. 22, 35 n.l 
(1978) (citing National Merchandising for "discussion and application of unjust 
enrichment theory to fines imposed for civil contempt"). 
Storage Technology, addressed in Point 1(B)(2), above, did involve a plaintiff 
seeking restitution for tortious interference, but each of plaintiff s claims was rejected on 
summary judgment for lack of proof of damages.5 See Storage Tech., 395 F.3d at 923. 
Applying Minnesota law, the court recognized that damages for tortious interference with 
contract are limited to the amount the plaintiff could have recovered under the underlying 
contract—i.e., lost profits. Id. at 923-25. 
5
 Storage Technology's expert concluded that "Cisco's valuation of NuSpeed 
(basically, its key people and storage technology expertise) was $450 million and 
represents a proper valuation of the damages to Storage Technology and due to it for the 
trade secret appropriation, corporate raiding, and breach of contract and fiduciary 
responsibilities promulgated." Storage Tech., 395 F.3d at 926. The trial court rejected 
the expert's opinion as "rank speculation." The appellate court agreed, finding that the 
expert "attributed the entire value of the NuSpeed acquisition to employees and trade 
secrets wrongfully appropriated from Storage Technology, even though NuSpeed had 
other assets and employees," and "did not attempt to value the people or the technology 
supposedly belonging to Storage Technology by any means other than by ascertaining 
what price Cisco paid for NuSpeed." Id. The court held that Storage Technology's 
failure to produce evidence substantiating any amount of damages or restitution is fatal to 
its tortious interference with contractual relations claim and its other claims. Id. at 929. 
The only restitution discussion in Storage Technology explained (in dicta since the 
claims failed), citing Cherne (already distinguished in Point 1(B)(1), above), that 
Minnesota courts would allow restitution if the interference induced an employee's 
breach of non-competition and nondisclosure covenants and fiduciary duties. Id. at 926, 
14 
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TruGreen similarly failed to present evidence substantiating its unjust enrichment 
theory. Because all claims in Storage Technology failed and because TruGreen never 
brought a breach of duty claim, see Point 1(B)(2), above, this case is not supporting 
authority for TruGreen's restitution theory. 
3. TruGreen9s Cases Can Be Read as Considering a Defendant's Gains 
Only to Reflect the Plaintiffs Lost Profits. 
The remaining out-of-state cases relied on by TruGreen to support its argument 
that restitution should be available under Utah law for tortious interference seem to 
consider the defendant's gains solely as a proxy for the plaintiffs lost profits. This 
authority does not change the well-settled Utah authority that lost profits is the remedy 
for tortious interference. See Respondents' Opening Brief at Point 11(A), (B). 
In Sandare Chemical Co. v. WAKO International, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1991),6 the award at issue was a lost profits calculation. In Sandare, the trial court 
awarded Nuclear "WAKO's proportionate share of Sandare's profits subsequently 
derived from Sandare's manufacture and sale of the test." Id. This "proportionate share" 
equaled WAKO's losses from Sandare's tortious interference—the amount WAKO 
would have received if it could have gone forward with its own existing contract. Thus, 
the court awarded Nuclear—as WAKO's assignee—nothing more than WAKO's share of 
the proceeds in the sale of the tests, i.e. WAKO's own lost profits. 
6
 Other jurisdictions have refused to follow the language cited in Sandare and 
disallowed a plaintiff a disgorgement remedy. See, e.g., Robert Plan Corp. v. Onebeacon 
Ins., 809 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Misc. 2005). 
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In National Merchandising, the court arguably only used the defendants' gains as 
a proxy for proving the plaintiffs losses as a contempt sanction. After explaining that the 
measure of damages for tortious interference is "the loss of advantages . . . which, but for 
such interference the plaintiff would have been able to attain or enjoy," the court allowed 
recovery based on the defendants' net gains—an "approximation" of the plaintiffs 
losses—because there was "nothing unreasonable . . . in the judge's taking the gross 
tainted sales of [defendant] as not exceeding the sales of which [plaintiff] was capable, 
had the interference not occurred." National Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 774-75; see 
also Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1135 (interpreting National Merchandising as 
awarding amount "roughly equal to the defendant's profits from commission of the tort 
or the plaintiffs lost profits"). 
Likewise, in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 
683 (10th Cir. 1989), although awarding "restitutionary damages," the court did nothing 
more than use the defendant's net gains as a proxy for plaintiffs losses. In that case, the 
plaintiff and defendant were gas pipeline companies that entered into a servicing 
agreement which required the plaintiff to sell to defendant specified quantities of gas. 
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (D. 
Wyo. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 885 F.2d 683. The defendant breached its 
contract by refusing to take the plaintiffs gas and the plaintiff was forced to relinquish 
rights it had to purchase gas from a third party, Whitney Canyon. Id. at 1456-57. The 
defendant then contracted with Whitney Canyon and sold Whitney Canyon gas to its 
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customers. Id. at 1457. The court awarded to the plaintiff the defendant's net profits 
from the sale of Whitney Canyon gas to the defendant's customers. Id. at 1478. 
The damages award in Colorado Interstate was nothing more than an award to the 
plaintiff of its lost profits from being unable to sell the Whitney Canyon gas. The 
defendant bought exactly the same gas that the plaintiff would have purchased, and then 
sold this gas at a profit. Colorado Interstate, 885 F.2d at 690. Defendant's gains from 
these sales were equal to the lost profits the plaintiff would have made but for the 
interference; thus, although couched in terms of "restitution," this case, too, exemplifies 
the proper use of gains only as a proxy for the plaintiffs actual lost profits. 
Finally, in Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 757 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1985), the 
amount awarded equaled the total amount of profit from a contract fulfilled by the 
defendant that originally had been awarded to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs initially 
contracted with a third party, NAB, to provide insulation for subway cars. Unable to 
provide the insulation themselves, the plaintiffs contacted and came to terms with the 
defendant for the insulation. The defendant subsequently contracted directly with NAB 
to provide the insulation. Id. at 1404-06. The court awarded to the plaintiffs the actual 
net profits that the defendant earned under the NAB contract. See id. at 1412. Because 
the defendant took from the plaintiffs a specific customer and a specific contract, its 
SLC 140835 
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profit was a reasonable estimate of the plaintiffs' lost profits. Thus, Zippertubing should 
-l 
be viewed as awarding lost profits. 
In sum, each of these cases relied on by TruGreen confirms that lost profits are the 
correct remedy for tortious interference. 
4. TruGreen's Cases Involve "Aggravated" Circumstances Not 
Existing in the Present Case. 
An additional basis to distinguish National Merchandising is its reliance on 
"aggravated" circumstances in assessing damages. National Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d 
at 776. The "aggravated circumstances" included the conscious encouragement of the 
breach of a consent decree entered against other defendants. Id. at 775 (noting that 
defendant "knowingly abetted the violation of a decree"). Thus, National Merchandising 
awarded a punitive measure of damages. See also American Air Filter Co., Inc. v. 
McNichol 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975) (limiting precedent relied on by plaintiff 
because restitution or "accounting" was awarded "as a measure of punitive damages 
because of the defendants' misconduct," and refusing to allow accounting to be measure 
of damages for tortious interference). 
Unlike National Merchandising, a punitive measure of damages is inappropriate 
here, where the District Court expressly found as a matter of law: 
7
 See also Miller Medical Sales, Inc. v. Worstell, No. 93AP-23, 1993 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 6251 (Dec. 21, 1993) (awarding damages based on defendant's gains on 
employer's former customer's own accounts serviced by defendant in breach of covenant 
not to compete); Try Hours, 2007 Ohio 1328, ffl| 27-28 (overturning trial court's 
exclusion of expert testimony of plaintiff s lost profits when expert determined plaintiffs 
losses by looking at defendants' gains derived from plaintiffs own actual customers to 
show lost profits). 
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TruGreen has failed to demonstrate additional aggravating circumstances, 
and the facts of this case are not so unusual or outrageous as to justify 
punitive damages. Consequently, the court eliminates punitive damages as 
a form of potential recovery for TruGreen. 
R.253 (Feb. 18, 2006 Order) at 44. This case does not involve the violation of a decree or 
other "aggravated circumstances" present in National Merchandising. As a result, that 
holding is not persuasive here. 
B, Sound Policy Does Not Support Restitution as a Remedy for Tortious 
Interference, 
1. This is Not a Trade Secret Misappropriation, Passing Off, or Trade 
Name, Trade Mark, or Copyright Infringement Case. 
The Court should reject TruGreen's attempt to analogize the proper remedy for 
tortious interference to other torts that allow restitution. These other torts include 
different interests that make them inapplicable to the narrow issue before the Court. 
First, TruGreen tries to argue by analogy to a misappropriation of trade secrets 
claim. However, the reach of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act is limited to protecting 
information that fits the statutory definition of a "trade secret," and expressly preempts all 
other analogous causes of action. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-8 (expressly displacing 
all "tort, restitutionary, and other law of this state providing civil remedies for 
misappropriation of trade secret"); see, e.g., Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van 
Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[u]nless defendants 
misappropriated a (statutory) trade secret, they did no legal wrong"). To allow restitution 
in circumstances "one step removed" from a trade secret, TruGreen Brief at 33, would 
extend trade secret remedies beyond the point the legislature expressly intended. 
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Next, TruGreen resorts to law governing tries to state a claim for passing off or 
misappropriation of a trade name, trademark, or copyright. However, like trade secrets 
misappropriation, claims for trade mark or copyright infringement have a statutorily 
enacted remedy of restitution, which is not the case for common-law tortious 
interference. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) ("[P]laintiff shall be entitled . . . to recover 
defendant's profits" for trademark infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (allowing recovery 
of the profits of an infringer in a patent infringement action). 
Moreover, "palming off claims permit restitution because the gains from the 
wrong closely approximate the plaintiffs actual harm—the benefit a party gains by 
passing off a good as that of another equates to the amount of gain that the harmed party 
would have received from selling its own goods. See, e.g., Forster Mfg. Co. v. Cutter-
Tower Co., 211 Mass. 219, 223 (1912) (noting that defendants' profits were recoverable 
for palming off because it allowed defendant to gain "plaintiffs customers and trade") 
(cited in National Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775). This is not the case here, where 
TruGreen has failed to show a correlation between its own alleged actual loss from its 
departing customers and the remedy it seeks—Mower Brothers' entire gross revenues 
from all sales to those same customers. 
2. TruGreen's Alleged Actual Damages Are Ascertainable, But 
TruGreen Elected Not to Try and Prove Them. 
TruGreen argues that it should be allowed restitution because it cannot prove its 
damages, but there is no evidence that it could not prove damages—instead only that 
TruGreen chose not to do so (presumably because it had not suffered lost profits as a 
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result of respondents' alleged interference). TruGreen did claim lost profits early on in 
the case—instructing its expert to rely on alleged lost income of TruGreen as opposed to 
Mower Brothers' revenue. See R.255 at 9 and Ex. A (memorandum on plaintiffs 
damages) (noting that TruGreen had done a "but for" calculation of decreases in 
o 
TruGreen's new sales and customers). Later in the case, in attempting unsuccessfully to 
avoid summary judgment as to the lack of causation or damages, TruGreen inexplicably 
abandoned this theory of damages to rely instead on respondents' gains. See TruGreen's 
Brief at 4. 
The District Court held, however, that actual damages could be calculated readily. 
See R.l 12 at 6-7 (July 25, 2006 Order) ("[T]the court finds that the injury here is not 
irreparable because TruGreen's damages can be calculated. Money damages, including 
lost profits, attorney's fees, and costs associated with hiring and training new employees, 
will place TruGreen in nearly the same position it would have been had the defendants 
not violated their contracts."). TruGreen simply chose not to try to prove them, as 
Respondents' expert painstakingly demonstrated and the Court found. See Expert 
Report, R.240 at 99; Order, R.286 at 8; R.255 at 8 (June 8, 2007 Order) ("TruGreen has 
failed to produce any evidence of what damage to TruGreen is attributable to any of the 
Defendants."). Thus, as in Developers Three, where the plaintiff expressly disavowed a 
lost profit theory of damages, the Court should hold that restitution is unavailable. 
See R.240 at 19-22 (TruGreen's explanation for abandoning lost profits). 
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3. TruGreen Should Not Be Allowed to Seek as Restitution an Amount 
Greater Than It Would Have Enjoyed Had There Been No Alleged 
Breach. 
Restitution or disgorgement is an improper remedy for tortious interference 
because it could, and likely would, give TruGreen a substantial windfall. See Developers 
Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1134; American Air Filter, 527 F.2d at 1300. TruGreen attempts to 
avoid the windfall argument, see TruGreen Brief at 37, but ignores the undisputed fact 
that it did not lose a single customer as a result of respondents' alleged interference. See 
R.240 at 99 (uncontroverted expert opinion that that there was no customer crossover due 
to alleged actions of respondents). Absent crossover of specific TruGreen customers, 
Mower Brothers' profits or revenues are not TruGreen's losses. Any award to TruGreen 
of Mower Brothers' gains would thus be a windfall, which Utah law does not recognize 
as an appropriate remedy for tortious interference. 
4. Punitive Damages—Not Unjust Enrichment—Are the Appropriate 
Means of Punishing Tortious Interference When Necessary. 
Restitution or unjust enrichment remedies should not be used to "punish" 
defendants for their torts. Like TruGreen, other plaintiffs often argue as a basis for 
restitution "that an intending tortfeasor should not be prompted to speculate that his 
profits might exceed the injured party's losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort." 
Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1134. However, "an award of defendant's profits is not 
the only means of discouraging a tortfeasor from interfering with a business relationship 
while calculating that his profits will exceed the injured party's losses." Id. 
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In some cases, a defendant's conduct will make him susceptible to punitive 
damages. See id. at 1135, see also ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 260 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting that punitive damages are available for tortious interference 
but upholding trial court's refusal of such damages). Punitive damages should "serve 
well to counterbalance the unavailability of an unjust enrichment theory in tortious 
interference." Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1135; see also Marcus, Stowel & Beye 
Govt. Sec., Inc. v. Jefferson Invest Corp.,, 797 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he 
jury's finding of actual malice entitled [plaintiff] to recover exemplary damage . . . . 
Thus, where an interfering party's conduct is particularly egregious, Texas law provides a 
device to deprive the wrongdoer of those profits obtained by the wrongful conduct."). 
Rather than adopt a restitutionary remedy to deter wrongdoing, the Court should continue 
to allow punitive damages, where appropriate, to serve such a role. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request that the Court resolve 
the certified questions in the Order of Acceptance in the manner detailed in respondents' 
opening brief. 
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2008. 
[ONES & PlNEGAR 
Richard M. Hymas 
J. Mark Gibb 
Erik A. Olson 
Jason R. Hull 
Attorneys for Respondents 
23 
SLC 140835 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of January, 2008,1 caused two copies of the 
foregoing RESPONSIVE BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to be served on the following 
by U.S. Mail: 
Brian C. Johnson 
William B. Ingram 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
SLC 140835 
24 
